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Abstract. We study competitive equilibrium in sequential economies under
limited commitment. Default induces permanent exclusion from financial mar-
kets and endogenously determined solvency constraints prevent debt repudia-
tion. We establish Welfare Theorems under a weaker notion of constrained
efficiency, inspired by Malinvaud, corresponding to the absence of welfare
improving feasible redistributions over finite (though indefinite) horizons. A
Negishi’s Method permits to show that, for any arbitrary value of social welfare
in between autarchy and constrained optimality, there exists an equilibrium
attaining that value. This method is also exploited to verify equilibrium inde-
terminacy.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we study debt enforcement within a large class of competitive
economies under sequentially complete markets. Debtors might not deliver on their
promises and debt repudiation induces permanent exclusion from market partici-
pation (Eaton and Gersovitz [16], Kehoe and Levine [18, 19], Kocherlakota [21] and
Alvarez and Jermann [4, 5]). At equilibrium, default is prevented by endogenously
determined debt limits, quantitative bounds specific to individuals and contingen-
cies, which enforce the maximum expansion of risk-sharing subject to individual
rationality of debt repayments (Alvarez and Jermann [4]). The risk of default
limits the diversification of idiosyncratic risks at equilibrium. Comparing with
Arrow-Debreu economies, incomplete risk-sharing yields predictions more in line
with empirical observations: the asset pricing kernel is more volatile and more sen-
sitive to idiosyncratic risks; safe interest rates are lower and risk premia are higher;
individual consumptions are imperfectly correlated with aggregate consumption
and positively correlated with individual incomes.
A great advantage of Alvarez and Jermann’s [4] economy with limited commit-
ment, compared with the more traditional paradigms of incomplete asset markets
and liquidity-constrained asset markets, is analytical tractability. Indeed, autarchic
reservation utilities permit an unambiguous notion of constrained efficiency, corre-
sponding to the largest feasible risk-sharing subject to participation. Alvarez and
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Jermann [4] establish a qualified First Welfare Theorem and exploit a Second Wel-
fare Theorem to decentralize constrained efficient allocations. Thus, as in classical
macroeconomic analysis, a sort of Negishi’s Method delivers equilibrium restric-
tions on asset prices and consumptions. Nevertheless, Alvarez and Jermann [4]
also show that autarchy is always an equilibrium, albeit not constrained efficient,
and that equilibria might not achieve a constrained efficient diversification of risk.
Constrained inefficiency occurs whenever the value of aggregate endowment is not
finite, or equilibrium does not exhibit high implied interest rates, interpreted as a
failure of social transversality.
We expand Alvarez and Jermann’s [4] approach to possibly constrained inefficient
equilibria. Beyond generality, and a merely theoretical interest, this extension is of
relevance for two reasons. First, constrained inefficient equilibria exhibit lower vol-
umes of trade and smaller risk-diversification, compared with constrained efficient
equilibria. This might improve predictions of macroeconomic dynamics, given the
concerns raised, among others, by Krueger and Perri [23], Cordoba [14], Krueger,
Lustig and Perri [24] and A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda [1]. Second, purely ex-
trinsic, or sunspot, uncertainty is ineffective at constrained efficiency, but it might
amplify volatility when constrained efficiency is violated. Prices might react to
spontaneous revisions of expectations, thereby propagating real disturbances, sus-
taining turbulences and inducing financial distresses. Simple examples by Azariadis
[7] and Antinolfi, Azariadis and Bullard [6] suggest a large equilibrium indeter-
minacy in economies with limited commitment. A deeper understanding of the
complete structure of equilibria, and of related indeterminacy, might be a progress
along this line of research.
A complete characterization of equilibria is attained by developing an extended
Negishi’s Method (Negishi [29]). In particular, we restore Welfare Theorems for a
weak form of constrained efficiency. Malinvaud, or short-run, constrained optimal-
ity corresponds to the absence of a welfare-improving feasible redistribution of risk,
subject to participation, over any finite horizon (as in Malinvaud [27, 28], Balasko
and Shell [8] and Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw [3]). We show that any equilib-
rium is a Malinvaud constrained optimum (First Welfare Theorem) and, conversely,
any Malinvaud constrained optimum can be sustained as an equilibrium for some
balanced distribution of initial claims (Second Welfare Theorem). Importantly, the
Second Welfare Theorem is established for equilibria without mandatory savings
(i.e., only debt is restricted and traders are never obliged to accumulate assets).
The extended Negishi’s Method resembles the canonical approach in macroeco-
nomics (at least since Bewley [12] and Kehoe, Levine and Romer [20]). Indeed,
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Malinvaud constrained efficient allocations can be obtained by the maximization
of a utilitarian social welfare function over a restricted domain. This feasible set
contains all allocations, satisfying material and participation constraints, attain-
able by means of finitely many variations of a reference allocation. The restricted
social planner program behaves as the unrestricted social planning program, pro-
viding a sort of local contract curve, conditional on a given reference allocation.
By varying the reference allocation, we show that, globally, there is a vast mul-
tiplicity of constrained efficient allocations and, hence, by Welfare Theorems, of
competitive equilibria. In particular, given any arbitrary value of social welfare in
between autarchy and constrained optimality, there exists an equilibrium attaining
that value. In other terms, there is a continuum of equilibria with welfare declin-
ing from constrained efficiency to autarchy, provided that the latter is constrained
inefficient. Finally, we prove that this vast multiplicity of Malinvaud constrained
optima induces indeterminacy: an economy might admit an infinite set of equilib-
ria for a given distribution of initial claims (that is, given contractual obligations
inherited from the unrepresented past). Yet, not all distributions of initial claims
exhibit indeterminacy.
To some extent, the multiplicity of equilibria under limited commitment is not
surprising, though its pervasiveness might be. Debt contracts are enforced by the
threat of exclusion from financial markets and might sustain limited risk-sharing at
equilibrium. However, the underlying mechanism is merely reputational and, in a
sense, fragile. The value of reputation might dissipate over time and contingencies
because of dynamic complementarity (according to the terminology of Azariadis,
Antinolfi and Bullard [6]): the anticipation of tighter debt limits in the future
reduces the current value of market participation and increases the incentive to
default; debt limits immediately become tighter, responding to lower participation
incentives, and interest rate falls to balance the reduced volume of liabilities. This
self-fulfilling mechanism requires a failure of social transversality (a violation of
high implied interest rates). Consequently, any institutional arrangement enforcing
social transversality eliminates the real multiplicity of equilibria. This happens,
for example, when a sufficiently productive asset of infinite-maturity is traded, or
when outstanding public debt is backed by a non-vanishing stream of real primary
public surpluses.
A deeper understanding of equilibrium properties deserves additional work. In
the simple example of Azariadis, Antinolfi and Bullard [6] (see also Azariadis [7]
and our appendix C), inspired by Bewley [11], there are two individuals with al-
ternating endowments and a constant aggregate endowment. When endowments
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are sufficiently dispersed, the autarchy is constrained inefficient. The economy
admits a constrained efficient steady state and a continuum of other constrained
inefficient equilibria converging to autarchy. Hence, any displacement from con-
strained efficiency induces a complete collapse of financial markets in the long-run.
Examples under less restrictive hypotheses are extremely hard to handle even for
constrained efficient equilibria (for instance, Ljungqvist and Sargent [26, Chapter
20.11]). However, it seems that, in general, the value of reputation might dissipate
at some contingencies and preserve at other contingencies, with a complete collapse
of markets occurring only with positive (and possibly extremely low) probability,
in the spirit of the recent rare event doctrine for the understanding of asset prices
(for instance, Barro [9]).
Is multiplicity of competitive equilibria an artifact of the particular punishment
for default? Our techniques exploit a relevant feature of full exclusion, namely, the
fact that reservation utilities (the private values of default) are exogenous. This,
indeed, permits a dual characterization of equilibria by a Negishi’s Method. The
approach would straightforwardly extend to other exogenously specified reserva-
tion utilities. Multiplicity would persist under more lenient punishments, whereas
it would disappear for more severe punishments. For instance, when default is
punished by a partial confiscation of the endowment, beyond full exclusion, private
debts are backed by a share of private endowments and Malinvaud constrained
efficiency coincides with (unrestricted) constrained efficiency, thus ensuring deter-
minacy of competitive equilibrium (see appendix B).
Partial exclusion requires an alternative approach of analysis, as the extended
Negishi’s Method fails because of the pecuniary externality (that is, redistributions
of risk modify reservation utilities through changes in prices). Bulow and Rogoff
[13] and Hellwig and Lorenzoni [17] provide a relevant instance of partial exclusion:
debt repudiation inhibits future borrowing, though lending remains unrestricted.
Other examples include temporary exclusion for a limited number of periods or per-
manent exclusion with some probability. A unified treatment of all such instances,
at a level of generality comparable with that in this paper, does not seem straight-
forward, as an analogous dual approach is not practicable. However, the dynamic
complementarity of debt constraints remains and might induce some form of failure
of social transversality. Besides, other causes of indeterminacy might emerge (due
to the additional pecuniary externality). For instance, Hellwig and Lorenzoni [17,
Supplementary Material] provide a simple example showing local indeterminacy
of a steady state equilibrium (although indeterminacy only affects a transitional
phase).
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The paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3, we lay out the fundamen-
tals of a general multi-agent economy with uncertainty and we define a notion of
competitive equilibrium with sequential trades and not-too-tight debt constraints.
Some technical aspects in section 2 might be skipped at a first reading without af-
fecting the understanding of remaining parts of the paper. In section 4, we present
the Negishi’s Method, establishing Welfare Theorems under Malinvaud constrained
efficiency. In section 5, we prove equilibrium indeterminacy for an null distribution
of initial claims. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
2. Fundamentals
2.1. Time and uncertainty. Time and uncertainty are represented by an event-
tree S, a countably infinite set, endowed with partial ordering . For a date-event
σ in S, t (σ) in T = {0, 1, 2, . . . , t, . . .} denotes its date and
σ+ = {τ ∈ S (σ) : t (τ) = t (σ) + 1}
is the non-empty finite set of all immediate direct successors, where
S (σ) = {τ ∈ S : τ  σ}
is the set of all date-events τ in S (weakly) following date-event σ in S. The initial
date-event is φ in S, with t (φ) = 0, that is, σ  φ for every σ in S; the initial
date-event in S (σ) is σ in S. This construction is canonical (Debreu [15, Chapter
7]).
2.2. Vector spaces. We essentially adhere to Aliprantis and Border [2, Chapters
5-8] for terminology and notation. The reference vector space is L = RS , the space
of all real-valued maps on S, with typical element v = (vσ)σ∈S . The vector space
L is endowed with the canonical order: an element v of L is positive if vσ ≥ 0 for
every σ in S; it is strictly positive if vσ > 0 for every σ in S; finally, it is uniformly
strictly positive if, for some  > 0, vσ ≥  for every σ in S. For a positive element v
of L, we simply write v ≥ 0 and, when v in L is also non-null, v > 0. An element
v of L is bounded if, for some  > 0, |vσ| ≤  for every σ in S; it is summable if∑
σ∈S |vσ| is finite; it is eventually vanishing if {σ ∈ S : |vσ| > 0} is a finite subset
of S. The vector subspace of L, consisting of all eventually vanishing elements v
of L, is denoted by C. Finally, the vector space L is endowed with the product
topology.
2.3. Individuals. There is a finite set J of individuals. For every individual i in
J , the consumption space Xi is the positive cone of the commodity space L. A con-
sumption plan xi in Xi is interior (respectively, bounded) if it is uniformly strictly
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positive (respectively, bounded). An allocation is a distribution of consumption
plans across individuals. The space of allocations is
X =
{
x ∈ LJ : xi ∈ Xi for every i ∈ J } .
An allocation x in X is interior (respectively, bounded) if every consumption plan
xi in Xi is interior (respectively, bounded).
2.4. Endowments. For every individual i in J , the endowment ei in Xi is interior
and bounded. In particular, there exists a sufficiently small 1 >  > 0 satisfying,
at every date-event σ in S,
 ≤
∧
i∈J
eiσ ≤
∨
i∈J
eiσ ≤
1

1
card (J ) ,
where card (J ) in N denotes the cardinality of J . This hypothesis imposes a
uniform lower bound on the endowment of individuals and, across individuals, an
upper bound on the aggregate endowment.
2.5. Preferences. We allow for heterogeneous impatience and subjective beliefs,
retaining time-additivity of intertemporal utilities in order to simplify the presen-
tation. For every individual i in J , the per-period utility function ui : R+ → R
is bounded, continuous, continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave. (As far as smoothness is concerned, more precisely, the per-period utility
function is continuously differentiable on R++.) For every individual i in J , the
utility function U i : Xi → R is given by
U i
(
xi
)
=
∑
σ∈S
piiσu
i
(
xiσ
)
,
where pii is a strictly positive summable element of L. Also, for any date-event σ
in S, at any consumption plan xi in Xi,
U iσ
(
xi
)
=
1
piiσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piiτu
i
(
xiτ
)
.
This is the continuation utility beginning from date-event σ in S.
2.6. Uniform impatience. We impose a uniform bound on the marginal rate
of substitution of perpetual future consumption for current consumption. This
hypothesis implies a uniform form of impatience across individuals and date-events
(see, for instance, Levine and Zame [25, Assumption 5] or Santos and Woodford
[30, Assumption 2]). Basically, there exists a sufficiently small 1 > η > 0 satisfying,
for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in S,
piiσ ≥ η
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piiτ .
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2.7. Boundary conditions. This additional hypothesis ensures interiority. For
every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in S,
ηui (0) + (1− η)ui
(
1

)
< ui () ,
where 1 >  > 0 is given by the bounds on endowments and 1 > η > 0 by the
hypothesis of uniform impatience.
2.8. Subjective prices. At an interior consumption plan xi in Xi, the subjective
price pi in P i is defined by(
piσ
)
σ∈S =
(
piiσ∂u
i
(
xiσ
))
σ∈S .
The subjective price pi in P i is a strictly positive summable element of L.
2.9. Feasible allocations. An allocation x in X is feasible if it exhausts aggregate
resources and satisfies participation constraints, that is,∑
i∈J
xi =
∑
i∈J
ei
and, for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in S,
U iσ
(
xi
) ≥ U iσ (ei) .
The space of all feasible allocations is denoted by X (e). Notice that feasibility
reflects both material constraints and participation constraints.
Under the maintained assumptions on preferences and endowments, every feasi-
ble allocation is, as a matter of fact, an interior allocation. The particular form of
boundary conditions, which is a joint restriction on preferences and endowments,
guarantees interiority of consumptions, subject to participation constraints, avoid-
ing unbounded per-period utilities and, hence, simplifying the presentation.
Lemma 1 (Interiority). Every feasible allocation is interior.
3. Equilibrium
Trade occurs sequentially. In every period, a full spectrum of elementary Arrow
securities is available for trade, each of which promising a unitary payoff, contingent
on the occurrence of a distinct event in the following period. The asset market is,
thus, sequentially complete. It simplifies to represent implicit prices of contingent
commodities in terms of present values. They are denoted by p in P , the space
of all strictly positive elements of L. At every date-event σ in S, a portfolio, with
8
deliveries v in L at the following date-events, has a market value, in terms of current
consumption, given by
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ .
It should be remarked that, at a price p in P , the present value of an arbitrary
bounded consumption plan is not necessarily finite.
An individual i in J participates into financial markets. The holding of securities
is represented by a financial plan vi in V i, the space of all unrestricted elements
of L. Positive values correspond to claims, whereas negative values are liabilities.
This participation occurs subject to a sequential budget constraint imposing, at
every date-event σ in S, ∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ + pσ
(
xiσ − eiσ
) ≤ pσviσ.
Accumulated wealth serves to finance current consumption, in excess to current
endowment, and current net asset positions (claims or liabilities). Participation into
financial markets is further restricted by quantitative limits to private liabilities.
These debt limits are given by f i in F i, the set of all positive and bounded elements
of L. The financial plan vi in V i is subject, at every date-event σ in S, to a debt
(or solvency) constraint of the form
−f iσ ≤ viσ.
From the perspective of the individual, debt limits are given exogenously.
As in Eaton and Gersovitz [16], Kehoe and Levine [18], Kocherlakota [21] and
Alvarez and Jermann [4], commitment is limited. Individuals might not honor
their debt obligations, even though the material availability of future endowments
would suffice for a complete repayment. When debt is repudiated, assets are seized
and the individual is excluded from future participation into financial markets,
though maintaining claims into future uncertain endowment. Thus, unhonored
debt induces a permanent reverse to autarchy. At equilibrium, debt limits serve to
guarantee that, on the one side, debt repudiation is not profitable for individuals
and, on the other side, the maximum sustainable development of financial markets
is enforced. This is the notion of equilibrium with not-too-tight debt constraints
provided by Alvarez and Jermann [4].
Formally, an allocation x in X is an equilibrium allocation if there exist a price p
in P , debt limits f in F and financial plans v in V satisfying the following properties:
(a) For every individual i in J , the plan (xi, vi) in Xi × V i is optimal subject
to budget and debt constraints, given initial claims, that is, it maximizes
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intertemporal utility subject, at every date-event σ in S, to budget con-
straint, ∑
τ∈σ+
pτ v¯
i
τ + pσ
(
x¯iσ − eiσ
) ≤ pσ v¯iσ,
and to debt constraints,
− (v¯iτ + f iτ)τ∈σ+ ≤ 0,
given initial wealth viφ in R.
(b) Commodity and financial markets clear, that is,∑
i∈J
xi =
∑
i∈J
ei and
∑
i∈J
vi = 0.
(c) For every individual i in J , debt limits are not-too-tight, that is, at every
date-event σ¯ in S,
J iσ¯
(−f iσ¯; f i) = U iσ¯ (ei) ,
where
J iσ¯
(
wiσ¯; f
i
)
= supU iσ¯
(
x¯i
)
subject, at every date-event σ in S (σ¯), to budget constraint,∑
τ∈σ+
pτ v¯
i
τ + pσ
(
x¯iσ − eiσ
) ≤ pσ v¯iσ,
and to debt constraints,
− (v¯iτ + f iτ)τ∈σ+ ≤ 0,
given initial wealth wiσ¯ in R. (By convention, the supremum over an empty
set is negative infinity.)
Notice that, at equilibrium, for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in
S,
U iσ
(
xi
)
= J iσ
(
viσ; f
i
) ≥ J iσ (−f iσ; f i) = U iσ (ei) .
Hence, an equilibrium allocation x in X is, as a matter of fact, an element of X (e),
the space of feasible allocations.
We adopt a restrictive notion of equilibrium: first, we require debt limits to be
positive; second, we exclude speculative bubbles. Possibly negative debt limits,
which are allowed by Alvarez and Jermann [4], would constrain individuals to hold
positive wealth at some contingencies; by defaulting at those contingencies, a trader
would in fact refuse a net payment; the enforcement mechanism would be unnatu-
ral: A trader would certainly profit from a voluntary exclusion from markets after
receiving (and, hence, accepting) the net payment. Furthermore, negative, and
possibly unbounded, debt limits would sustain speculative bubbles at equilibrium,
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a circumstance that has been shown by Kocherlakota [22], based on some properties
of homogeneity of the budget set. Finally, notice that debt limits are consistent
at equilibrium (according to the terminology borne out by Levine and Zame [25]).
Debt limits are consistent when the maximum amount of debt can be honored by
means of current endowment and by issuing future contingent debt up to the limit,
that is, for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in S,
pσf
i
σ ≤ pσeiσ +
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ .
4. Extended Negishi’s Method
4.1. Malinvaud efficiency. Malinvaud efficiency is inherited from studies on cap-
ital theory (e.g., Malinvaud [27, 28]) and overlapping generations economies (e.g.,
Balasko and Shell [8]). The canonical notion of Pareto efficiency requires the ab-
sence of a welfare improvement, subject to material and participation constraints.
Thus, an allocation x in X (e) is Pareto (constrained) efficient if it is not Pareto
dominated by an alternative allocation z in X (e). The notion of Malinvaud effi-
ciency, instead, imposes weaker restrictions, as it simply requires the absence of a
welfare improvement, subject to material and participation constraints, over any
arbitrary finite horizon. Consistently, an allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud (con-
strained) efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation z in
C (e, x), where
C (e, x) =
{
z ∈ X (e) :
∑
i∈J
∣∣zi − xi∣∣ ∈ C}
is the set of all allocations z in X (e) that modify allocation x in X (e) only over
a finite horizon. (Remember that C is the set of all eventually vanishing elements
of L.) Clearly, any Pareto optimum is a Malinvaud optimum. However, Malinvaud
optimality is a largely weaker requirement: for instance, any autarchic allocation is a
Malinvaud optimum. Indeed, as only variations of consumption over finite horizons
are allowed, no redistribution satisfies participation constraints at terminal nodes
of the finite horizon, because a donor cannot be compensated by the promise of
higher continuation utilities. Hence, by induction, no redistribution is the only
feasible allocation.
Malinvaud efficiency admits a characterization in terms of supporting price. This
is an elaboration on the common duality argument, developed in the literature
on capital theory and, more recently, for economies of overlapping generations by
Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw [3]. The (algebraic) dual of the vector subspace
C of L can be identified with L itself, under the duality operation given, for every
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(v, f) in C × L, by
f (v) = f · v =
∑
σ∈S
fσvσ.
To simplify notation, let
C∗ (e, x) =
{
z ∈ X∗ (e) :
∑
i∈J
∣∣zi − xi∣∣ ∈ C} ,
where X∗ (e) is the set of all allocations z in X such that, for every individual i in
J , at every date-event σ in S,
U iσ
(
zi
) ≥ U iσ (ei) .
Lemma 2 (First-order conditions). An allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud efficient
if and only if there exists a price p in P satisfying, at every allocation z in C∗ (e, x),
for every individual i in J ,
(s) U i
(
zi
)
> U i
(
xi
)
only if p · (zi − xi) > 0.
Equivalently, an allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud efficient if and only if there
exists a price p in P satisfying, for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ
in S,
(c-1)
(
pτ
pσ
)
τ∈σ+
≥
(
piτ
piσ
)
τ∈σ+
and
(c-2)
∑
τ∈σ+
(
pτ
pσ
)(
U iτ
(
xi
)− U iτ (ei)) = ∑
τ∈σ+
(
piτ
piσ
)(
U iτ
(
xi
)− U iτ (ei)) ,
where pi in P i is the subjective price at interior consumption plan xi in Xi.
Restriction (s) coincides with an admittedly abstract characterization of Malin-
vaud optima in terms of supporting positive linear functionals, whereas conditions
(c-1)-(c-2) uncover an equivalent formulation in terms of more treatable first-order
conditions. For the sake of simplicity, though this is unprecise, the above charac-
terization might be illustrated by referring to a canonical social planner problem.
Restrictions (c-1)-(c-2) correspond, in this analogy, to the Euler equations in-
duced by the maximization of (weighted) social welfare subject to material con-
straints and to participation constraints. They basically rule out the circumstance
of a constrained individual exhibiting a marginal rate of substitution strictly above
the marginal rate of substitution of an unconstrained individual. This, indeed,
would expose to an arbitrage opportunity, as a substitution of future consumption
for current consumption of the unconstrained individual, balanced by the opposite
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substitution for the constrained individual, would not violate participation con-
straint, as utility of the unconstrained individual is strictly above the autarchic
utility, and would produce a welfare improvement.
The remarkable implication of this full characterization is that a Malinvaud
optimum does not impose any restriction in terms of social transversality or, alter-
natively, does not rule out any arbitrage opportunity at infinitum. A substitution
of current consumption for perpetual future consumption might still generate a
welfare improvement, subject to feasibility.
4.2. Social planning. A canonical method in macroeconomic theory permits the
study of Pareto efficient allocations by means of a social planning programme.
Given welfare weights θ in Θ, social welfare is measured by the weighted sum of
utilities,
Wθ (x) =
∑
i∈J
θiU i
(
xi
)
,
where
Θ =
{
θ ∈ RJ+ :
∑
i∈J
θi = 1
}
.
It is well-established that an allocation x in X (e) is Pareto efficient if and only if
there exist welfare weights θ in Θ satisfying
Wθ (x) = max
z∈X(e)
Wθ (z) .
Various properties of efficient allocations are directly obtained by exploiting this
well-behaved convex programme.
To provide an analogous treatment of Malinvaud efficiency, we introduce a re-
stricted feasible set for social planning. Given an allocation x in X (e), define
F (e, x) = closure
{
z ∈ X (e) :
∑
i∈J
∣∣zi − xi∣∣ ∈ C} ,
where the closure is taken in the product topology. Intuitively, this restricted
feasible set consists of all allocations z in X (e) that can be approached by means
of finitely many variations of a reference allocation x in X (e). Importantly, this
restricted feasible set is convex and compact.
Lemma 3 (Social planning). An allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud efficient if and
only if, for some allocation y in X (e) such that x lies in F (e, y), there exist welfare
weights θ in Θ satisfying
Wθ (x) = max
z∈F (e,y)
Wθ (z) .
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The comparison between the Pareto (unrestricted) planner problem and the
Malinvaud (restricted) planner problem reveals strong analogies. By a canonical
application of the Maximum Theorem, solutions vary continuously with welfare
weights. Hence, the restricted planner problem yields a connected set of Malinvaud
efficient allocations for any arbitrarily given reference feasible allocation. This,
along with Welfare Theorems, provides a potential tool for the computation of
competitive equilibria.
4.3. Multiplicity of Malinvaud optima. We now provide a partial characteri-
zation of Malinvaud optima. In particular, we prove that there exists a continuum
of such optima with social welfare decreasing from Pareto efficiency to autarchy.
(Obviously, when the autarchy is Pareto efficient, this multiplicity disappears.)
Malinvaud optima are parameterized by welfare weights θ in Θ and an index ξ in
Ξ = [0, 1] measuring the failure of Pareto (constrained) optimality. Hence, the set
of Malinvaud optima contains a set that is isomorphic to Θ× Ξ.
Proposition 1 (Multiplicity). Given welfare weights θ in Θ, for any arbitrary
value ξ in Ξ = [0, 1], there exists a Malinvaud efficient allocation x in X (e) with
social welfare satisfying
(w-1) Wθ (x) = Wθ (e) + ξ
(
max
z∈X(e)
Wθ (z)−Wθ (e)
)
and
(w-2) Wθ (x) = max
z∈F (e,x)
Wθ (z) .
This simple characterization emerges by means of artificial truncated planner
problems, along with a limit argument. A truncation consists in imposing additional
restrictions on the amount of redistributed resources that can be implemented out
of some finite horizon. For a given truncation, the severity of these additional
restrictions determines the value of the social planner problem: under the most
severe restrictions, the redistribution vanishes out of a finite horizon and, hence,
the autarchy is the only feasible allocation (indeed, a decrease of consumption in the
last period of the truncation cannot be compensated by an increase of consumption
in the following periods and, hence, by induction, no redistribution is the only
feasible policy); under the least severe restrictions, any feasible allocation can be
implemented and, hence, a Pareto optimum obtains. It follows that, for any given
truncation, some properly chosen degree of severity of additional constraints would
yield a given social welfare in between autarchy and Pareto efficiency. Taking the
limit over finite horizons, a limit allocation emerges with a given social welfare value
(as this can be assumed to be constant along the sequence). This limit allocation
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is Malinvaud efficient because, as the finite horizon extends along the sequence of
truncations, first-order conditions are satisfied along larger and larger horizons.
4.4. Welfare Theorems. We here show equivalence between equilibrium alloca-
tions and Malinvaud efficient allocations. Indeed, any equilibrium allocation is
Malinvaud efficient (First Welfare Theorem) and any Malinvaud efficient allocation
emerges as an equilibrium allocation for some balanced distribution of initial claims
(Second Welfare Theorem). As a matter of fact, we prove that Malinvaud efficiency
exhausts all restrictions on equilibrium prices and allocations.
Proposition 2 (First Welfare Theorem). Any equilibrium allocation is a Malinvaud
efficient allocation.
The First Welfare Theorem is almost immediate. Indeed, first-order conditions
for a Malinvaud optimum coincides with those for an equilibrium under limited
commitment (see Alvarez and Jermann [4]). At equilibrium, the marginal rate of
substitution of an individual falls below the market rate of substitution only if this
individual is constrained in issuing further debt obligations, for otherwise a budget-
balanced (marginal) substitution of future consumption for current consumption
would yield an increase in welfare.
Proposition 3 (Second Welfare Theorem). Any Malinvaud efficient allocation is
an equilibrium allocation.
The proof of the Second Welfare Theorem cannot rely on a traditional separation
argument alone. Indeed, separation yields potential equilibrium prices fulfilling
first-order conditions (lemma 2). Such prices, however, might not belong to the
dual of the commodity space (restricted by the aggregate endowment) and, thus,
might not deliver a well-defined intertemporal accounting. In order to provide their
Second Welfare Theorem for Pareto efficient allocations, Alvarez and Jermann [4]
assume that prices belong to the dual of the (restricted) commodity space (the
hypothesis of high implied interest rates) and recover financial plans at equilibrium
as the present value of future contingent net trades. We cannot count on this
simple method and need an alternative proof. Furthermore, differently from Alvarez
and Jermann [4], as well as from Kocherlakota [22], we impose positivity of debt
limits (individuals cannot be restricted to hold positive amounts of wealth along
the infinite horizon), which poses additional difficulties.
To recover financial plans, we construct an adjustment process that increases
debt, when more debt is budget-feasible, and decreases debt, when outstanding
debt is budget-unfeasible. This process admits a fixed point and, at the fixed point,
15
sequential budget constraints are balanced and financial markets clear. To identify
a suitable interval, we move from a basic observation. We evaluate welfare gains,
with respect to the autarchic utility, in terms of current consumption. Participation
guarantees that these welfare gains are positive across date-events. Also, they fulfill
sequential budget constraints at subjective prices (marginal utilities). As market
rates of substitution differ from individual marginal rates of substitution only when
welfare gains vanish, the process of welfare gains also satisfies sequential budget
constraints at market prices. This yields an upper bound on the amount of wealth
held at equilibrium, as welfare gains are positive (hence, fulfil debt limits) and
sustains the given consumption plan subject to sequential budget constraints. Since
financial plans need be balanced at equilibrium across individuals, the negative of
the sum of welfare gains poses a lower bound to financial plans.
Optimality of consumption plans, subject to budget constraints and debt con-
straints, is ensured by first-order conditions at a Malinvaud optimum. Hence, it
only remains to reconstruct suitable debt limits. Here, we follow Alvarez and Jer-
mann [4]. When an individual is at the autarchic utility, outstanding debt coincides
with the maximum amount of debt. When an individual is not at the autarchic
utility, we compute the maximum amount of sustainable debt, which depends on
the future contingent plan for debt limits. Beginning with sufficiently large debt
limits, this process of adjustment generates a decreasing sequence of debt limits
and, in the limit, we obtain not-too-tight debt constraints. The identification of
suitable upper bounds requires some elaboration.
5. Indeterminacy
Indeterminacy pertains to the existence of an infinite set of competitive equilib-
ria for given endowments and given (balanced) distribution of initial claims. It is
preliminarily worth remarking that initial claims, or liabilities, are real and that
debt limits are restricted to be positive at equilibrium. Therefore, indeterminacy
is not a nominal phenomenon, caused by the unavoidable multiplicity of the price
level, as in monetary overlapping generations economies. Furthermore, it is not
due to the occurrence of bubbles, uncovered by Kocherlakota [22], which would
require that traders be forced to accumulate assets by negative debt limits (i.e.,
mandatory savings). As a matter of fact, unrestricted debt limits would immedi-
ately induce indeterminacy by homogeneity of budget sets, independently of the
established multiplicity of Malinvaud optima: a given equilibrium allocation would
be consistent with any arbitrary distribution of initial claims.
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The intuition for indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium is given by the fun-
damental characterization of Malinvaud optima (proposition 1). Indeed, welfare
weights account for a merely distributive multiplicity, reflecting the distribution of
initial claims. It remains an autonomous degree of multiplicity, interpretable as a
measure of the reputation of debtors, varying from values enforcing the develop-
ment of financial markets (efficiency) to the complete collapse of financial markets
(autarchy). Beyond intuition, common techniques of analysis in the literature are
not directly applicable and a formal proof is not straightforward.
Consider the space of balanced distributions of initial wealth,
Ω =
{
ω ∈ RJ :
∑
i∈J
ωi = 0
}
.
Also, let Eω (e) denote the set of equilibrium allocations x in X (e) which are consis-
tent with the distribution of initial claims ω in Ω. By means of the adapted Negishi’s
Method, we establish the existence of equilibria with a null initial distribution (nei-
ther claims nor liabilities inherited from previous contractual arrangements).
Lemma 4 (Existence). Given any arbitrary allocation y in X (e),
Ω (e, y) = {ω ∈ Ω : Eω (e) ∩M (e, y) is non-empty}
is a connected set containing the null distribution of initial claims in Ω, where
M (e, y) =
{
x ∈ F (e, y) : Wθ (x) = max
z∈F (e,y)
Wθ (z) for some θ ∈ Θ
}
.
The argument unfolds as follows. Within the given component of Malinvaud
efficient allocations, every allocation is consistent with some distribution of initial
claims by the established Second Welfare Theorem. We adjust welfare weights
inversely with the initial claims held by traders. This process admits a fixed point
and, at the fixed point, the initial claim of a trader is strictly positive only if the
corresponding welfare weight vanishes and, thus, the trader is at the reservation
utility. However, this cannot occur, as market participation, subject to positive
debt limits, always guarantees a utility strictly higher than autarchy when a trader
begins with a strictly positive claim.
This persistence of the null distribution, across components of Malinvaud efficient
allocations, reveals the existence of an infinite set of competitive equilibria, with
social welfare varying from efficiency to autarchy.
Proposition 4 (Indeterminacy). Given the null distribution of initial claims, there
exists an infinite set of equilibria, i.e., E0 (e) is not finite.
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To ascertain determinacy, or indeterminacy, of equilibrium for given non-null
distributions of initial claims appears technically difficult (in particular, when the
supporting welfare weights are extreme points and some individuals are at the
autarchic utilities). By means of numerical computations, in the classical example
with periodic endowments (Azariadis [7] and Azariadis, Antinolfi and Bullard [6]),
we show that the Pareto efficient steady state distribution of initial claims is not
consistent with inefficient allocations converging to the autarchy: debt limits should
be negative in some periods to sustain such allocations as equilibria (see appendix
C). Thus, at least for some specifications of utility and endowments, the stationary
Pareto efficient equilibrium is determinate.
6. Conclusion
We have shown multiplicity, and related indeterminacy, of equilibria in economies
with limited enforcement and not-too-tight debt limits. In particular, we have de-
veloped a method that exploits Welfare Theorems for deriving a full characteriza-
tion of equilibria. These theorems are established for a weak form of optimality,
corresponding to the absence of a feasible Pareto improving redistribution over a
finite number of time periods. These weak optima, in turn, are characterized by
means of sequences of planning objectives with limited amounts of redistributions
in the long-run. The method shows that, at equilibrium, social welfare varies from
two extreme outcomes: constrained Pareto optimality and autarchy.
Our contribution bears very important consequences on the understanding of
the type of equilibria that may emerge in economies where contract enforcement is
limited and the no default option is implemented by imposing individual specific
debt constraints. In particular, these equilibria suffer from a severe form of fragility:
a change in expectations at any given equilibrium, where asset trades guarantee an
optimal amount of consumption smoothing across states and time periods, might
generate a contraction of net trades, in some cases leading to financial collapse.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. At a feasible allocation, for every individual i in J , partici-
pation constraints impose, at every date-event σ in S,
ui
(
xiσ
)− ui(1

)
+
1
piiσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piiτu
i
(
1

)
≥
U iσ
(
xi
) ≥ U iσ (ei)
≥ 1
piiσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piiτu
i () .
Therefore, exploiting uniform impatience and boundary conditions,
ui
(
xiσ
) ≥ ui(1

)
+
1
η
(
ui ()− ui
(
1

))
> ui (0) ,
which produces a uniformly strictly positive lower bound on consumptions. 
Proof of lemma 2. Sufficiency of a supporting price p in P (i.e., condition (s))
for Malinvaud efficiency is obvious, as it is proved by the traditional argument for
the canonical First Welfare Theorem. Therefore, we show that restrictions (c-1)-
(c-2) imply condition (s). Consider any alternative allocation z in C∗ (e, x) and
suppose that, for some individual i in J ,
0 < U i
(
zi
)− U i (xi) ≤∑
σ∈S
piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
)
.
Define, at every date-event σ in S,
viσ =
1
piσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
)
.
Notice that vi is an element of C. A simple decomposition yields, at every date-
event σ in S,
(*)
∑
τ∈σ+
piτv
i
τ + p
i
σ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ piσviσ.
Furthermore, notice that convexity of preferences and participation constraints im-
ply that, at every date-event σ in S,
viσ < 0 only if U
i
σ
(
ei
) ≤ U iσ (zi) < U iσ (xi) .
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Therefore, restrictions (c-1)-(c-2), along with inequality (*), guarantee that, at
every date-event σ in S, ∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ + pσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ pσviσ.
Consolidating across date-events, and noticing that vi is an element of C, one
obtains
p · (zi − xi) = ∑
σ∈S
pσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
)
≥ pφviφ
=
(
pφ
piφ
)∑
σ∈S
piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
)
> 0,
thus proving the claim.
Assume now that the allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud-efficient and define a
price p in P by means, at every date-event σ in S, of(
pτ
pσ
)
τ∈σ+
=
∨
i∈J
(
piτ
piσ
)
τ∈σ+
.
This price p in P obviously satisfies condition (c-1). The necessity of condition
(c-2) straightforwardly obtains by means of the argument in Alvarez and Jermann
[4, Proposition 3.1]. As conditions (c-1)-(c-2) imply restriction (s), this completes
the proof. 
Proof of lemma 3. Preliminarily observe that an allocation x in X (e) is Mal-
invaud inefficient if and only if it is strictly Pareto dominated by an alternative
allocation z in C (e, x). Indeed, any balanced redistribution of initial consumptions
does not affect future participation. Suppose that allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud
efficient. Obviously, x lies in F (e, x). A canonical application of the Separation
Theorem yields the existence of welfare weights θ in Θ such that
Wθ (x) = max
z∈F (e,x)
Wθ (z) .
To prove the reverse claim, it suffices to establish that C (e, x) is contained in
F (e, y). Let z be in C (e, x) and consider any sequence {xn}n∈N in C (e, y) ap-
proaching x in F (e, y). For every individual i in J , let F i be the finite subset of
all date-events in S at which the reallocation is not terminated, that is,
σ ∈ (S/F i) if and only if (ziτ)τ∈S(σ) = (xiτ)τ∈S(σ) .
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Given 1 > λ > 0, for every sufficiently large n in N, consider the allocation xn +
λ (z − x) in X. This is a balanced allocation, as consumptions are strictly positive.
We show that, for every sufficiently large n in N, it also satisfies participation.
Notice that participation might be violated only on the finite set
F =
⋃
i∈J
F i.
If it is violated, there exists an individual i in J such that, at some date-event σ
in F i, for infinitely many n in N,
U iσ
(
xin + λ
(
zi − xi)) < U iσ (ei) .
In the limit, this implies
U iσ
(
xi + λ
(
zi − xi)) ≤ U iσ (ei) ,
which, by convexity of preferences, reveals a contradiction. Hence, for every suffi-
ciently large n in N, allocation xn + λ (z − x) belongs to C (e, y). By closure, for
every 1 > λ > 0, x + λ (z − x) lies in F (e, y) and, hence, z lies in F (e, y), thus
proving the claim. 
Proof of proposition 1. The proof is decomposed in several separate steps. First,
we construct a sequence of truncated planner problems, by adding additional aux-
iliary constraints on the transfers across individuals; truncated optima exist and,
at given welfare weights θ in Θ, social welfare might be measured by ξ in Ξ by con-
trolling for the severity of additional constraints on transfers. Second, we generate
a sequence of truncated optima, maintaining a constant value of social welfare, and
we consider the limit allocation of these truncated planner problems. Third, we
prove that the limit allocation is in fact a Malinvaud optimum fulfilling conditions
(w-1)-(w-2).
Truncation. Given any t in T , consider a collection of t-truncated planner problems:
V tθ () = max
x∈X(e)
∑
i∈J
θiU i
(
xi
)
subject to, at every date-event σ in (S/St),
(†)
∑
i∈J
∣∣xiσ − eiσ∣∣ ≤ ,
where, for every t in T ,
St = {σ ∈ S : t (σ) ≤ t} .
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Constraints are given as a continuous correspondence of  in R+ with non-empty
convex and compact values. (Indeed, notice that the map x 7→ |x| is convex. In
addition, if allocation x in X (e) satisfies constraints (†) at  in R++, then allocation
x−
(
− ∗

)+
(x− e) ∈ X (e)
satisfies constraints (†) at ∗ in R+.) Hence, by the Maximum Theorem, the max-
imum is achieved and the value function is continuous in  in R+.
Observe that, when  in R+ is sufficiently large, the truncated problem delivers a
constrained Pareto efficient allocation, that is, V tθ () = maxx∈X(e)Wθ (x); when  in
R+ vanishes, the truncated problem delivers the autarchy, as this is the only feasible
allocation x in X (e) satisfying additional constraints (†), that is, V tθ (0) = Wθ (e).
Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, for some value of  in R+,
V tθ () = Wθ (e) + ξ
(
max
x∈X(e)
Wθ (x)−Wθ (e)
)
.
Let xt be an allocation in X (e) that solves the t-truncated planner problem at the
value of  in R+ fulfilling the above restriction. 
Limit. The sequence of allocation {xt}t∈T in X (e), at no loss of generality, con-
verges to some allocation x in X (e) in the product topology. Also, by continuity
of preferences, restriction (w-1) is satisfied by the limit allocation x in X (e). 
Malinvaud optimality in the limit. It remains to verify that condition (w-2) is valid
in the limit. Supposing not, there exists an alternative allocation z in C (e, x)
satisfying Wθ (z) > Wθ (x). Defining the set F as in the previous part, for every
sufficiently large t in T , F ⊂ St. Hence, allocation z in X (e) fulfills the additional
restrictions (†) for every sufficiently large t in T . It follows that, for every sufficiently
large t in T , Wθ (xt) ≥Wθ (z), yielding a contradiction. 
The sequence of steps proves the proposition. 
Proof of proposition 2. Using lemma 2, Malinvaud efficiency follows from the
simple first-order characterization of equilibrium that is provided by Alvarez and
Jermann [4, Propositions 4.5-4.6]. 
Proof of proposition 3. The proof is rather involved, so that we decompose it
in several steps.
Recovering financial plans. To simplify notation, we introduce the positive linear
operator T : L→ L that is defined, at every date-event σ in S, by
T (v)σ =
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ .
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For an individual i in J , let gi in L be given, at every date-event σ in S, by
giσ =
(
piiσ
piσ
)(
U iσ
(
xi
)− U iσ (ei)) ≤ 1piiσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piiτ
(
ui (1/)− ui ()
∂ui (1/)
)
.
Notice that, by uniform impatience and feasibility, gi is a bounded and positive
element of L. Furthermore, observe that, by convexity of preferences, at every
date-event σ in S,
piiσ
(
U iσ
(
xi
)− U iσ (ei)) ≥ piiσ (ui (xiσ)− ui (eiσ))+ ∑
τ∈σ+
piiτ
(
U iτ
(
xi
)− U iτ (ei))
≥ piσ
(
xiσ − eiσ
)
+
∑
τ∈σ+
piiτ
(
U iτ
(
xi
)− U iτ (ei)) .
This, exploiting first-order conditions at a Malinvaud optimum, yields
T
(
gi
)
+
(
xi − ei) ≤ gi.
Finally, define g =
∑
i∈J g
i and observe that g is a positive bounded element of L.
Define H as the set of all h in [0, g]
J
satisfying∑
i∈J
hi = g.
The set H is non-empty, convex and compact (in the product topology). Define a
correspondence f : H → H by means of
f (h)σ = arg minhˆσ∈Hσ
∑
i∈J
hˆiσ
(
T
(
gi − hi)
σ
+
(
xi − ei)
σ
− (gi − hi)
σ
)
.
Basically, if a financial plan lies in the interior of the budget constraint at some
date-event, current debt is increased. By construction, given any h in H, at every
date-event σ in S, there exists an individual i in J such that
T
(
gi − hi)
σ
+
(
xi − ei)
σ
≤ (gi − hi)
σ
,
as ∑
i∈J
(
T
(
gi − hi)+ (xi − ei)) = 0 = ∑
i∈J
(
gi − hi) .
The correspondence f : H → H is clearly closed with non-empty and convex
values. Moreover, since H is compact, f is also upper hemi-continuous. Therefore,
by Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, it admits a fixed point h in H. At a fixed point,
for every individual i in J , at any date-event σ in S,
T
(
gi − hi)
σ
+
(
xi − ei)
σ
>
(
gi − hi)
σ
implies hiσ = 0.
Hence,
giσ ≥ T
(
gi
)
σ
+
(
xi − ei)
σ
≥ T (gi − hi)
σ
+
(
xi − ei)
σ
> giσ,
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which is a contradiction. Thus, at a fixed point, for every individual i in J ,
T
(
gi − hi)+ (xi − ei) ≤ (gi − hi) .
Since, aggregating on J , ∑i∈J hi = ∑i∈J gi, the latest suffices to prove exact
budget-feasibility, that is, for every individual i in J ,
T
(
gi − hi)+ (xi − ei) = (gi − hi) .
To conclude, for every individual i in J , the financial plan vi = gi − hi in V i is
bounded, balances budget sequentially and satisfies, at every date-event σ in S,
U iσ
(
xi
)
= U iσ
(
ei
)
only if viσ = g
i
σ − hiσ ≤ giσ ≤ 0.
Furthermore, across individuals, financial plans v in V satisfy market clearing, that
is, ∑
i∈J
vi = 0.
We treat such financial plans as given in the remaining parts of this proof. 
Individual optimality. For every individual i in J , consider the set of all date-events
at which this individual is at the autarchic utility, that is,
Si = {σ ∈ S : U iσ (xi) = U iσ (ei)} .
Also, define the space F i
(
xi, vi
)
of all debt limits f i in F i satisfying, at every
date-event σ in S, viσ + f iσ ≥ 0 and, at every date-event σ in Si, viσ + f iσ = 0. We
here show that consumption plan xi in Xi is optimal, subject to budget and debt
constraints, given initial claims, at all debt limits f i in F i
(
xi, vi
)
.
Peg any date-event σ in S. Observe that, as budget is balanced,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ −
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
(
viτ + f
i
τ
)− (xiσ − eiσ) ≤ −viσ.
Furthermore, considering any alternative budget feasible consumption plan zi in
Xi satisfying debt constraints,
− 1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ +
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
(
wiτ + f
i
τ
)
+
(
ziσ − eiσ
) ≤ wiσ.
Using first-order conditions, one obtains
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ −
1
piσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piτ
(
viτ + f
i
τ
)− (xiσ − eiσ) ≤ −viσ
and
− 1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ +
1
piσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piτ
(
wiτ + f
i
τ
)
+
(
ziσ − eiσ
) ≤ wiσ.
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Therefore, adding up terms, it follows that
(††)
∑
τ∈σ+
piτ
(
wiτ − viτ
)
+ piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ piσ (wiσ − viσ) .
For every t in T , let
St = {σ ∈ S : t (σ) = t} and St = {σ ∈ S : t (σ) ≤ t} .
Consolidating inequalities (††) up to period t in T , and using the fact the initial
claims are given,∑
σ∈St
piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ ∑
τ∈St+1
piτ
(
viτ − wiτ
) ≤ ∑
τ∈St+1
piτ
(
viτ + f
i
τ
)
,
where the last inequality follows from debt constraints. By concavity of utility, this
suffices to prove optimality, as the right hand-side vanishes in the limit, because pi
in P i is a summable element of L and vi + f i is a bounded element of L. 
Recovering debt limits. Given debt limits f i in F i, at every date-event σ¯ in S, let
Biσ¯
(
wiσ¯; f
i
)
be the set of all plans
(
x¯i, v¯i
)
in Xi×V i satisfying, at every date-event
σ in S (σ¯), budget constraint,∑
τ∈σ+
pτ v¯
i
τ + pσ
(
x¯iσ − eiσ
) ≤ pσ v¯iσ,
and debt constraints,
− (v¯iτ + f iτ)τ∈σ+ ≤ 0,
given initial wealth wiσ¯ in R.
Consider the set
Di =
{(
wi, f i
)
: Biσ¯
(
wiσ¯; f
i
)
is non-empty at every σ¯ ∈ S} ⊂ V i × F i.
This domain is non-empty, closed and convex. Define a value function J i : Di → L
by means, at every date event σ¯ in S, of
J iσ¯
(
wiσ¯; f
i
)
= max
{
U iσ¯
(
x¯i
)
:
(
x¯i, v¯i
) ∈ Biσ¯ (wiσ¯; f i)} .
It is straightforward to verify that this value function is well-defined, as the maxi-
mum xi is achieved, and fulfils the following properties: (i) it is bounded; (ii) it is
concave; (iii) it is weakly increasing in f i in F i and strictly increasing in wi in V i
on its domain Di; (iv) for every f¯ i in F i, it is continuous on the restricted domain{(
wi, f i
) ∈ Di : f i = f¯ i}
and upper semi-continuous on the restricted domain{(
wi, f i
) ∈ Di : f i ≤ f¯ i} ;
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(v) for every f i in F i
(
xi, vi
)
, by construction,
(
vi, f i
)
is an element of the domain
Di and, by the previous argument for optimality, at every date-event σ¯ in S,
() J iσ¯
(
viσ¯; f
i
)
= U iσ¯
(
xi
)
.
We now show some properties of differentiability of the value function. Given
any f i in F i
(
xi, vi
)
and any wi in V i satisfying wi ≥ vi−xi, (wi, f i) is an element
of the domain Di and, by optimality, at every date-event σ in S,
J iσ
(
wiσ; f
i
) ≥ ui (xiσ + (wiσ − viσ))+ 1piiσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piiτJ
i
τ
(
viτ ; f
i
)
≥ ui (xiσ + (wiσ − viσ))+ 1piiσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piiτU
i
τ
(
xi
)
.
By a well-known result in convex analysis (see Benveniste and Sheinkman [4]), given
any f i in F i
(
xi, vi
)
, the value function admits a (partial) derivative at
(
vi; f i
)
in
Di and, at every date-event σ in S,
∂J iσ
(
viσ; f
i
)
= ∂ui
(
xiσ
)
Thus, given any f i in F i
(
xi, vi
)
, consider any
(
wi, f i
)
in Di satisfying, at some
date-event σ in S, J iσ
(
wiσ; f
i
) ≥ U iσ (ei) and wiσ ≤ viσ. Concavity delivers
U iσ
(
ei
)− U iσ (xi) ≤
Jσ
(
wiσ; f
i
)− Jσ (viσ; f i) ≤ ∂ui (xiσ) (wiσ − viσ)
≤ ξ (wiσ − viσ) ,
where
ξ =
∧
σ∈S
∂ui
(
xiσ
)
> 0.
Therefore, rearranging terms,
viσ −
U iσ
(
xi
)− U iσ (ei)
ξ
≤ wiσ.
Also, by uniform impatience and boundedness of per-period utility, there exists a
sufficiently large φ > 0 satisfying
φ >
∨
σ∈S
U iσ
(
xi
)− U iσ (ei)
ξ
.
It follows that, given any f i in F i
(
xi, vi
)
, for every
(
wi, f i
)
in Di,
(‡) J iσ
(
wiσ; f
i
) ≥ U iσ (ei) only if wiσ ≥ viσ − φ.
We shall exploit this fundamental inequality in order to recover not-too-tight debt
limits.
27
We implicitly define an operator Gi : F i
(
xi, vi
) → F i (xi, vi) by setting, at
every date-event σ in S,
J iσ
(−Gi (f i)
σ
; f i
)
= U iσ
(
ei
)
.
To prove that this operator is well defined, pegging any date-event σ in S, observe
that
J iσ
(
0; f i
) ≥ J iσ (0; 0) ≥ U iσ (ei)
and
J iσ
(−giσ; f i) ≤ ui (0) + 1piiσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piiτU
i
τ
(
xi
)
< U iσ
(
ei
)
,
where
0 ≤ giσ = sup
{−wiσ ∈ R : Biσ (wiσ; f i) is non-empty} ≤ eiσ + 1pσ ∑τ∈σ+ pτf iτ ,
as utility satisfies boundary conditions. Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem,
Gi
(
f i
)
exists in L. Also, it is positive and bounded, as market clearing and first-
order conditions (c-1)-(c-2) imply
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ ≤
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
∑
j∈J
f jτ
=
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
∑
j∈J
(
vjτ + f
j
τ
)
=
∑
j∈J
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
(
vjτ + f
j
τ
)
=
∑
j∈J
1
pjσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pjτ
(
vjτ + f
j
τ
)
≤
∑
j∈J
(∨
τ∈S
∣∣vjτ + f jτ ∣∣
)
1
pjσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pjτ
and uniform impatience yields
1
pjσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pjτ ≤
1
pijσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pijτ
(
∂uj ()
∂uj (1/)
)
≤ 1
η
(
∂uj ()
∂uj (1/)
)
.
Furthermore, at every date-event σ in S,
J iσ
(
viσ; f
i
)
= U iσ
(
xi
) ≥ U iσ (ei) = J iσ (−Gi (f i)σ ; f i)
and, at every date-event σ in Si,
J iσ
(
viσ; f
i
)
= U iσ
(
xi
)
= U iσ
(
ei
)
= J iσ
(−Gi (f i)
σ
; f i
)
.
Hence, Gi
(
f i
)
is an element of F i
(
xi, vi
)
. Finally, observe that the operator
Gi : F i
(
xi, vi
)→ F i (xi, vi) is (weakly) monotone.
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Construct debt limits f¯ i in F i
(
xi, vi
)
so that f¯ iσ = −viσ, at every date-event σ
in Si, and f¯ iσ ≥ −viσ + φ, at every date-event σ in
(S/Si). We claim that Gi (f¯ i)
in F i
(
xi, vi
)
satisfies Gi
(
f¯ i
) ≤ f¯ i. Indeed, exploiting restriction (‡), at every
date-event σ in
(S/Si),
Gi
(
f¯ i
)
σ
≤ −viσ + φ ≤ f¯ iσ;
at every date-event σ in Si,
Gi
(
f¯ i
)
σ
= −viσ = f¯ iσ.
Now, by induction, construct a sequence
((
Gi
)n (
f¯ i
))
n∈T in F
i
(
xi, vi
)
. Such a
sequence is weakly decreasing and bounded, as
f¯ i ≥ (Gi)n (f¯ i) ≥ (Gi)n+1 (f¯ i) ≥ −vi.
Hence, it converges to some f i in F i
(
xi, vi
)
in the product topology. By upper
semi-continuity of the value function, at every date-event σ in S,
J iσ
(−f iσ; f i) ≥ U iσ (ei) .
Finally, suppose the latest holds with strict inequality at some date-event σ in S,
i.e., there exists  > 0 such that
Jσ
(−f iσ; f i) > J iσ (−f iσ − ; f i) > U iσ (ei) .
For every sufficiently large n in T , (Gi)n+1 (f¯ i)
σ
≤ f iσ +  and, therefore,
U iσ
(
ei
) ≥ J iσ (− (Gi)n+1 (f¯ i)σ ; (Gi)n (f¯ i))
≥ J iσ
(
−f iσ − ;
(
Gi
)n (
f¯ i
))
≥ J iσ
(−f iσ − ; f i)
> U iσ
(
ei
)
,
a contradiction. Hence, f i in F i are not-too-tight debt limits at equilibrium. 
The proof is now complete. 
Proof of lemma 4. Let M (e) be the set of Malinvaud efficient allocations. The
proof of the Second Welfare Theorem implicitly establishes the existence of a corre-
spondence G : M (e) ↪→ Ω giving distributions of initial claims which are consistent
with a given equilibrium allocation. Such a correspondence is closed with non-
empty convex values. In addition, at no loss of generality, for some sufficiently
large µ > 0, we can truncate Ω as
Γ =
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∑
i∈J
∣∣ωi∣∣ ≤ µ} ,
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which is a compact convex set. Indeed, we identify uniform upper bounds for
initial claims in the part on recovering financial plans of the proof of proposition 3.
Hence, by the Closed Graph Theorem, the correspondence G : M (e) ↪→ Γ is upper
hemi-continuous with non-empty convex values.
Let
fθ (e, y) = arg maxz∈F (e,y)Wθ (z) .
By Berge’s Maximum Theorem, the correspondence f (e, y) : Θ ↪→ F (e, y) is upper
hemi-continuous with non-empty values. Suppose that {x, z} ⊂ fθ (e, y). For every
1 > λ > 0, allocation λx+ (1− λ) z lies in F (e, y). By convexity of preferences, it
follows that∑
i∈J
θi
[
U i
(
λxi + (1− λ) zi)− λU i (xi)− (1− λ)U i (zi)] = 0.
Thus, for every individual i in
{
i ∈ J : θi > 0}, xi = zi. Suppose that, for some
individual i in
{
i ∈ J : θi = 0}, xi 6= zi. This implies that
U i
(
λxi + (1− λ) zi) > λU i (xi)+ (1− λ)U i (zi) ≥ U i (ei) .
As a slight reduction of initial consumption of this individual does not affect par-
ticipation, and such resources can be distributed to individuals in
{
i ∈ J : θi > 0},
this produces a contradiction. It follows that f (e, y) : Θ ↪→ F (e, y) is an up-
per hemi-continuous correspondence with single values and, in fact, a continuous
function. Hence, M (e, y) is connected, being the image of a connected set by a con-
tinuous function. Thus, G (M (e, y)) is connected, being the image of a connected
set by an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with non-empty convex values in
a topological vector space.
Construct now a correspondence F : Θ× Γ ↪→ Θ× Γ by setting, at every (θ¯, ω¯)
in Θ× Γ,
FΘ
(
θ¯, ω¯
)
= arg minθ∈Θθ · ω¯ and FΓ
(
θ¯, ω¯
)
= G (fθ¯ (e, y)) .
This correspondence is upper hemi-continuous with non-empty convex values. By
Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, it admits a fixed point
(
θ¯, ω¯
)
in Θ× Γ.
Suppose that, at the fixed point, for some individual i in J , ω¯i > 0. This implies
that θ¯i = 0 and, by optimality, U i
(
fθ¯ (e, y)
i
)
= U i (e). This is a contradiction,
as a strictly positive initial claim permits to achieve a utility strictly higher than
the autarchic utility, subject to budget feasibility, at positive debt limits. Hence,
ω¯ = 0, which proves the claim. 
Proof of proposition 4. Given strictly positive welfare weights θ in Θ, we exploit
proposition 1 to peg any sequence of allocations (yn)n∈N in X (e) satisfying, at every
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n in N,
Wθ (y
n) = Wθ (e) +
(
1
n
)(
max
z∈X(e)
Wθ (z)−Wθ (e)
)
and
Wθ (y
n) = max
z∈F (e,yn)
Wθ (z) .
Notice that this sequence consists of distinct non-autarchic allocations. Applying
lemma 4, there exists a sequence of non-autarchic allocations (xn)n∈N in E0 (e) such
that, for every n in N, xn lies in M (e, yn). Furthermore, by construction, for every
n in N,
Wθ (x
n) ≤Wθ (e) +
(
1
n
)(
max
z∈X(e)
Wθ (z)−Wθ (e)
)
.
It follows that the sequence (xn)n∈N in E0 (e) consists of infinitely many distinct
allocations, for otherwise some subsequence would converge to an allocation x in
X (e) with Wθ (x) > Wθ (e), violating the above inequality. 
Appendix B. Severe Punishments
By reducing the risk of default, severe punishments enlarge insurance opportu-
nities and increase social welfare at equilibrium. More relevantly for our analysis,
they guarantee constrained efficiency of competitive equilibrium and, thus, elimi-
nate indeterminacy.
Assume that the punishment for default consists of the exclusion from finan-
cial markets and, in addition, a partial confiscation of private endowment. This
hypothesis can be accommodated in our analysis by modifying participation for
constrained efficiency and by adapting restrictions for not-too-tight debt limits at
equilibrium. In particular, let 1 > λ ≥ 0 represent the portion of unexpropiable
private endowment after debt repudiation. For every individual i in J , at every
date-event σ in S, participation now imposes
U iσ
(
xi
) ≥ U iσ (λei) .
Futhermore, at a competitive equilibrium, debt limits satisfy
J iσ
(−f iσ; f i) = U iσ (λei) .
We argue that competitive equilibrium exhibits high implied interest rates (i.e.,
a finite present value of intertemporal endowment), so guaranteeing that a con-
strained efficient allocation of risk is achieved (by a straightforward adaptation of
Alvarez and Jermann’s [4, Corollary 4.7] First Welfare Theorem).
Suppose that, for some individual i in J , at date-event σ in S,
pσf
i
σ < (1− λ) pσeiσ +
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ .
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This means that, beginning with the maximum amount of debt and issuing future
contingent debt up to the limit, a consumption level strictly above the unexpropri-
able endowment is affordable. Therefore, by strict monotonicity of preferences,
J iσ
(−f iσ; f i) > ui (λeiσ)+ 1piiσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piiτJ
i
τ
(−f iτ ; f i)
= ui
(
λeiσ
)
+
1
piiσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piiτU
i
τ
(
λei
)
= U iσ
(
λei
)
,
which is a contradiction. Hence, for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ
in S,
pσf
i
σ ≥ (1− λ) pσeiσ +
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ .
Consolidating over date-events, and exploiting positivity of debt limits,
f iσ ≥ (1− λ)
1
pσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
pτe
i
τ .
This shows that, at equilibrium, prices involve high implied interest rates.
Incidentally, notice that, when the entire endowment can be confiscated after
default (λ = 0), for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in S, debt limits
satisfy
pσf
i
σ = pσe
i
σ +
∑
τ∈σ+
pτf
i
τ .
Thus, by consolidation,
f iσ =
1
pσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
pτe
i
τ + b
i
σ,
where bi is a positive element of L satisfying the martingale property
pσb
i
σ =
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ b
i
τ .
This bubble component vanishes at equilibrium by canonical arguments. Hence,
natural debt limits (that is, debt is bounded by the present value of private en-
dowment) correspond to not-too-tight debt limits with full confiscation of private
endowment after default.
Appendix C. Example
In this example, we examine limited commitment equilibria in the classical cyclic
economy of Bewley, also studied by Azariadis, Antinolfi and Bullard [6] and Azari-
adis [7]. Individuals trade securities to smooth idiosyncratic endowment fluctua-
tions. In a full commitment equilibrium, each individual will consume a constant
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share of aggregate endowment. Conversely, in a limited commitment equilibrium,
individual consumption might still fluctuate, as complete risk-sharing would violate
participation and, hence, induce default.
The economy has no uncertainty, T = S, and only two individuals called even
and odd, J = {e, o}. Preferences of individuals are represented by
U
(
xi
)
=
∑
t∈T
βtu
(
xit
)
,
where u : R+ → R is the common per-period utility and 0 < β < 1 is the common
discount factor. Endowments (ee, eo) are given by the two sequences
ee = (eh, el, eh, el, eh, el, . . .) ,
eo = (el, eh, el, eh, el, eh, . . .) ,
where eh > el > 0. Hence, aggregate endowment is constant and individual endow-
ments are perfectly negatively correlated. Finally, in order to ensure that trade oc-
curs at a constrained optimum and that an unconstrained optimum is not achieved,
we postulate that
βu′ (el) > u′ (eh)
and
u
(
eh + el
2
)
+ βu
(
eh + el
2
)
> u (eh) + βu (el) .
We consider Malinvaud efficient allocations where the high-endowment trader is
constrained in every period (which is a necessary property apart from an initial
transitory phase). Denoting (ξt)t∈T the sequence of positive transfers from the
high-endowment individual to the low-endowment individual, this is restricted by
u (eh − ξt) + βu (el + ξt+1) = u (eh) + βu (el) .
The obtained implicit difference equation admits a steady state ξ∗ > 0 and a
continuum of other solutions, monotonically decreasing to autarchy, for every initial
condition ξ0 in (0, ξ
∗). For each of such allocations, identified with an initial value
ξ0 in [0, ξ
∗], the sequence of implicit prices is given by
pt+1 =
[
βu′ (el + ξt+1)
u′ (eh − ξt)
]
pt.
Indeed, market interest rate coincides with the subject interest rate of the uncos-
trained individual.
To decentralize such Malinvaud efficient allocations as competitive equilibria, let
(vt)t∈T denote the sequence of positive claims held by an uncostrained individual.
By market clearing, the constrained individual holds a positive debt. For a given
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Malinvaud efficient allocation ξ0 in [0, ξ
∗], using budget constraint, the equilibrium
sequence of claims is restricted by
pt+1vt+1 = pt (ξt − vt) .
Ignoring positivity, such a difference equation generates a unique solution for any
arbitrary initial value v0. However, any non-positive solution implies non-positive
debt limits, that is, a constrained individual is forced to accumulate assets. Hence,
it is not consistent with our restrictive notion of competitive equilibrium.
We now perform the following exercise. We peg the initial claim corresponding
to the steady state equilibrium with trade,
v∗ =
(
1 +
βu′ (el + ξ∗)
u′ (eh − ξ∗)
)−1
ξ∗.
For every allocation ξ0 in (0, ξ
∗), we determine the sequence of claims (vt)t∈T
consistent with the initial value v0 = v
∗. We then verify whether such claims remain
positive and, thus, whether they sustain a competitive equilibrium under positive
debt limits. Positivity is hard to ascertain by means of analytical methods and,
therefore, we rely on numerical computations, although these cannot be decisive on
this matter.
Endowments are (el, eh) = (.7, 1.3). The discount factor is β = .8, whereas the
utility function is given by u (c) =
√
c. We find that, after an initial phase, claims
(and, hence, debt limits) oscillates between positive and negative values, over some
range, before converging to zero. These negative values of debt limits are smaller,
and occur in a farer horizon, the closer is the initial condition ξ0 to efficiency ξ
∗.
Our grid of initial values ξ0 is contained in (0, ξ
∗) with increments of 10−6. The
four panels below report the sequences of claims for different initial conditions ξ0
in (0, ξ∗).
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These computations cast some doubts on the claim of indeterminacy submitted
by Azariadis, Antinolfi and Bullard [6] (see, also, Azariadis [7]). It seems that the
constrained efficient steady state is determinate and, indeed, the unique equilibrium
of an economy with that distribution of initial claims, when debt limits are restricted
to be positive. As previously mentioned, all equilibria are indeterminate when debt
limits are not constrained by positivity.
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